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Disability or Identity? 
STUTTERING, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 
AND THE RIGHT TO SPEAK DIFFERENTLY AT 
WORK 
INTRODUCTION 
More than three million Americans stutter,1 and 
stuttering affects about 1 percent of the worldwide population.2 
Stuttering refers to involuntary interruptions in a person’s 
speech, where speech “is broken by repetitions (li-li-like this), 
prolongations (lllllike this), or abnormal stoppages (no sound) of 
sounds and syllables.”3 The cause of stuttering is unknown,4 and 
no cure for the condition has been found.5 Stuttering ranges in 
degree from mild to severe, and it often leads to “physical 
tension and struggle” in the speech muscles.6 Significantly, most 
people who stutter7 experience feelings of embarrassment, 
anxiety, and fear.8 
  
 1 Another term for stuttering is stammering. Stuttering Facts and Information, 
STUTTERING FOUND., http://www.stutteringhelp.org/Default.aspx?tabid=17 (last updated 
Jan. 20, 2011). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. These are not the only patterns of stuttering. See Stuttering Info, What 
Is Stuttering?, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N, http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringinformation/ 
generalinformation.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 4 Stuttering Info, What Causes Stuttering?, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N, 
http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringinformation/generalinformation.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2011). It is not caused by emotional problems or nervousness. Id. A recent 
study, however, suggests that genetics may play a role. Stephanie Smith, Unlocking a 
Medical Mystery: Stuttering, CNN (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2010/HEALTH/02/10/stuttering.genes.cell/. 
 5 Stuttering Info, What Help Is Available?, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N, 
http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringinformation/generalinformation.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2011). 
 6 Stuttering Info, What Is Stuttering?, supra note 3. 
 7 In this note, the terms stutterer and person who stutters will be used 
interchangeably. For an insightful piece that discusses these terms as labels, see John 
C. Harrison, Are You or Are You Not a Stutterer?, STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (May 1, 
1996), http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/kuster/Infostuttering/stuttererornot.html; see also 
MARTY JEZER, STUTTERING: A LIFE BOUND UP IN WORDS 16-20 (1997). 
 8 Stuttering Info, What Is Stuttering?, supra note 3. 
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Employment discrimination is a major concern for 
stutterers.9 Several studies indicate that people who stutter are 
disadvantaged in the employment context.10 According to 85 
percent of employers in one study, “stuttering decreases a 
person’s employability and opportunities for promotion.”11 
According to vocational rehabilitation counselors, who train 
individuals to enter the workforce, stuttering is “handicapping.”12 
Because stutterers are concerned with discrimination they 
might face in the workplace, this note considers the extent to 
which stuttering is covered under federal antidiscrimination 
statutes. One way to proscribe discrimination based on 
stuttering is to consider stuttering a disability under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as amended in 2008;13 
another way is through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 
Congress would need to amend the Civil Rights Act to 
accomplish this. This note examines both of these possibilities. 
This note argues that the federal government should 
ban discrimination based on stuttering. This note also argues 
that the law must carefully contemplate the nature of 
stuttering; in crafting stuttering antidiscrimination law, 
policymakers must acknowledge the population of stutterers 
who do not stutter often but who are still greatly limited by 
their stuttering, and they must determine how to provide legal 
protection for these individuals.15 Either of the two alternatives 
mentioned above can solve this problem, and this note will 
demonstrate how both of these solutions might play out. 
Ultimately, while coverage under Title VII would be more 
extensive, coverage under the amended ADA is more practical. 
Part I of this note explains what stuttering is, including 
the physical and emotional components of stuttering. Part I 
also describes the common misconceptions of stuttering and 
documents why workplace discrimination based on stuttering 
is a problem that needs to be addressed. Part II discusses the 
  
 9 William D. Parry, Fighting Employment Discrimination for People Who 
Stutter⎯Under the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, STUTTERING & LAW, 
http://www.stutterlaw.com/adaaa.htm (last updated July 14, 2010). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. (citing M.I. Hurst & E.B. Cooper, Employer Attitudes Toward 
Stuttering, 8 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 1 (1983)). 
 12 Id. (citing M.I. Hurst & E.B. Cooper, Vocational Rehabilitation Counselors’ 
Attitudes Toward Stuttering, 8 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 13 (1983)). 
 13 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. 
II 2009). 
 14 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 §§ U.S.C. 2000a-2000h-6 (2006). 
 15 See infra Part I. 
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original ADA, explaining why it was passed and the statutory 
scheme through which to bring a discrimination claim. Part II 
also documents cases involving stuttering discrimination 
claims that have been brought under the ADA as well as 
Supreme Court cases in which the ADA’s definition of disability 
was interpreted narrowly. Part III analyzes the ADA 
Amendments Act (ADAAA), the purposes of the amendments, 
and how the amendments affect stuttering discrimination 
claims. Part IV describes how it would be possible for an 
employee to bring a stuttering discrimination claim under the 
amended ADA. In Part V, this note proposes an alternative 
way to view stuttering—as an element of one’s personhood and 
identity, rather than as a disability. Under this identity model, 
stuttering discrimination would be covered under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act. Part V goes on to compare the two 
characterizations of stuttering and concludes that, although 
the identity model is more effective in obtaining stuttering 
discrimination coverage under the law, viewing stuttering as a 
disability is the more realistic path to coverage. 
I. OVERVIEW OF STUTTERING: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND, 
STEREOTYPES, AND EVIDENCE OF EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
Stuttering is complex and variable (in kind and degree), 
and this contributes to misunderstanding and prejudice 
against stutterers. This part describes what stuttering is and 
highlights both the physical and emotional aspects of the 
condition. In documenting the common stereotypes of 
stutterers, this part demonstrates how these misconceptions 
limit employment opportunities for people who stutter. 
Ultimately, this part shows that employment discrimination 
based on stuttering is a widespread problem. It also describes 
the emotional element of stuttering, which courts and 
lawmakers should consider in order to adequately combat 
stuttering discrimination in the workplace. 
A. Stuttering as a Physical and an Emotional Condition 
There are two major components of stuttering that must 
both be analyzed to determine a person’s severity of 
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stuttering.16 First, there is the physical or behavioral 
part⎯what an outside observer can perceive.17 Second, there is 
the emotional part, which is characterized by a stutterer’s 
feelings and attitudes about stuttering.18 Severity—or how 
much someone is limited by stuttering—is the sum of both of 
these physical and emotional factors for any one person and is 
therefore highly individualized.19 
The physical or behavioral characteristics of stuttering 
are important because they describe the actual disfluency that 
the outside listener can hear.20 Factors included in this analysis 
are how often moments of stuttering occur, how long they last, 
how much struggle is involved with them, and the types of 
disfluencies that are involved.21 Many people think of a severe 
stutterer as someone who has frequent moments of stuttering 
that tend to last a long period of time (numerous seconds).22 
The emotional aspects of stuttering, though, also play a 
large role in assessing a stutterer’s severity⎯the actual extent 
to which a person is affected by stuttering.23 Emotional issues do 
not cause stuttering; rather, they are often an effect of 
stuttering.24 People who stutter often have feelings associated 
with their stuttering, such as nervousness, anxiety, fear, 
frustration, shame, and guilt.25 But people who stutter also have 
certain attitudes associated with stuttering—that stuttering is 
bad or wrong, or that stuttering is a sign of weakness and 
  
 16 Stephen Hood & Chris Roach, I’ve Got a Secret⎯and It’s Scaring Me to 
Death! (The Story of a Covert Stutterer), STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (Aug. 18, 2001), 
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad4/papers/hood.html. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. Regarding word choice, this note will not often use the terms mild, 
moderate, and severe to refer to degree of stuttering because the terms are misleading. 
This note will instead discuss how often someone physically gets into a stuttering block 
by using terms that refer to the frequency of stuttering. For example, a way to discuss 
degrees of stuttering is to say that some people stutter frequently, while for other 
individuals it is barely noticeable. When this note does refer to mild or severe 
stuttering, though, assume that this is a reference to frequency of overt stuttering 
unless otherwise noted. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id.; see also Barry Yeoman, Wrestling with Words, PSYCHOL. TODAY, 
Nov./Dec. 1998, at 42, 44 (describing how for some stutterers the condition “means an 
intense and visible struggle to force individual syllables through their lips, a phenomenon 
that is physically exhausting for the speaker and mentally awkward for the listener”). 
 22 Hood & Roach, supra note 16. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Stuttering Info, What Is Stuttering?, supra note 3; Stuttering Info, What 
Causes Stuttering?, supra note 4. 
 25 Hood & Roach, supra note 16. 
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failure.26 People who have infrequent moments of stuttering as 
well as these feelings and attitudes often consciously try not to 
have a physical block whenever possible.27 If they are successful 
at avoiding physical blocks, the emotional aspects of stuttering 
may increasingly affect them; in this way, the severity of their 
stuttering conditions would be higher than observable.28 
Some people are so successful at hiding the physical 
aspects of stuttering that they become covert stutterers; they 
are able to hide their stuttering to such a great extent—
through various tricks and crutches—that they are able to pass 
as fluent speakers.29 Covert stutterers pay an insufferable price, 
though, because they fear the constant risk of being exposed.30 
One covert stutterer described the cost of hiding: “Constant 
terror! Fear, panic and anxiety lived with me every waking 
minute and even into sleep. Thoughts of discovery paralyzed 
me.”31 This demonstrates the inaccuracy of describing a covert 
stutterer as having a mild problem.32 Crucial to this 
understanding is that there is not only an emotional aspect to 
stuttering but that it can actually serve to reduce the frequency 
of actual physical stuttering blocks.33 In other words, the 
emotional aspect can lead an individual to use extremely 
emotionally taxing behaviors to disguise the physical aspect. 
Every person stutters with different levels of physical 
and emotional severity.34 An accurate analysis of how much a 
  
 26 Id.; see also Yeoman, supra note 21, at 44 (explaining that stutterers know 
“what it’s like to feel defective, to break a parent’s heart, to have trouble navigating the 
social milieu of the schoolyard”). 
 27 Hood & Roach, supra note 16. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. Covert stutterers substitute words and feign ignorance to such an 
extent that sometimes even their family members do not know their secret. Yeoman, 
supra note 21, at 44. 
 30 Hood & Roach, supra note 16; see also Terry Dartnall, Passing as Fluent, 
STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (2003), http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad6/papers/dartnall6.html 
(The author, a covert stutterer, describes the downside of covert stuttering: “The higher 
we fly, the harder we fall. The more fluent we appear to be⎯and are, for long 
periods⎯the harder it is when we land on our backsides.” But the author also describes 
the upside of being covert⎯not stuttering publicly⎯and does not ultimately fully endorse 
or condemn covert stuttering.). 
 31 Hood & Roach, supra note 16; see also Yeoman, supra note 21, at 44 
(describing the psychological fear and anxiety that covert stutterers experience). 
 32 Hood & Roach, supra note 16; see also supra note 19. 
 33 Hood & Roach, supra note 16. 
 34 Id. One way of demonstrating this is through the analogy of an iceberg. 
Russ Hicks, The Iceberg Analogy of Stuttering, STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (Aug. 18, 2003), 
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad6/papers/hicks6.html. In an iceberg, the visible 
amount of ice above the water’s surface is much smaller than the amount of ice that is 
below the surface. Id. The above-the-water part of the stuttering iceberg is the physical 
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person is affected by stuttering would include an assessment of 
both the physical and emotional aspects.35 This is a widely held 
view in the field of speech pathology.36 Moreover, this 
background knowledge is crucial to fully understanding the 
next section’s discussion of stuttering in the workplace. 
B. Stuttering Stereotypes and Their Relation to Stuttering 
in the Workplace 
People who stutter are subject to society’s widespread 
negative stereotypes about stuttering.37 There is a widespread 
belief that stutterers as a group “exhibit certain negative 
personality traits such as being shy, quiet, nervous, tense, 
afraid, self-conscious, etc.”38 Moreover, there are common myths 
that people who stutter are not as intelligent as those who are 
fluent39 and that underlying nervousness causes stuttering.40 
Stuttering in the workplace is a significant issue for people 
who stutter.41 A large study of employers’ attitudes toward 
stuttering conducted in 1983 demonstrates employers’ widespread 
negative attitudes toward people who stutter: 30 percent of 
employers thought that stuttering interferes with job 
performance, 40 percent thought it negatively affects promotion 
possibilities, 44 percent thought that stutterers should seek 
employment that does not require a lot of speaking, and 85 
percent thought that stuttering decreases employability to at 
least some degree.42 In a 1994 survey of people who stutter, 16 
percent of the stutterers had been told that they would not be 
hired because of their stuttering, more than half thought that 
their supervisor had misjudged their capabilities because of 
stuttering, and more than one-third received negative 
  
aspect of stuttering, while the below-the-surface part is the emotional aspect. Id. Not 
only is this emotional part invisible, but it is often larger than the physical part. Id. 
 35 Hood & Roach, supra note 16. 
 36 See J. Scott Yaruss, Assessing Quality of Life in Stuttering Treatment Outcomes 
Research, 35 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 190, 190 (2010) (noting how “stuttering can involve far 
more than just observable speech disfluencies” and citing a plethora of sources). 
 37 Michael P. Boyle et al., Effects of Perceived Causality on Perceptions of 
Persons Who Stutter, 34 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 201, 204 (2009). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Stuttering: Answers for Employers, STUTTERING FOUND., 
http://www.stutteringhelp.org/Default.aspx?tabid=13 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 40 Stuttering Info, What Causes Stuttering?, supra note 4. 
 41 Joseph F. Klein & Stephen B. Hood, The Impact of Stuttering on Employment 
Opportunities and Job Performance, 29 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 255, 256 (2004). 
 42 Id. (citing Hurst and Cooper, supra note 11, at 1). 
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performance evaluations because of stuttering.43 A 2004 survey 
also documented that people who stutter believe that their 
stuttering is a “major handicap” in their working lives.44 More 
than 70 percent of the stutterers surveyed thought that they had 
a decreased opportunity to be hired and promoted than 
nonstutterers, and 69 percent believed that their past job 
performance was hindered because of stuttering.45 
II. THE ORIGINAL AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: 
BACKGROUND AND CASES INVOLVING STUTTERING 
One possible way to deal with employment 
discrimination based on stuttering is through the federal statute 
that protects employees who have disabilities, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.46 This part begins by discussing Congress’s 
purpose in passing the Act, and it continues by describing how 
an employee may bring a discrimination claim under the ADA. 
Several employees who stutter have brought ADA claims 
against their employers, but these claims have been largely 
unsuccessful. One significant reason for this lack of success is 
that the U.S. Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted certain 
key provisions of the ADA regarding the definition of disability. 
Ultimately, this part demonstrates that while there was once 
some likelihood that the ADA would cover stuttering, by the 
early 2000s the Supreme Court had significantly limited the 
probability that the ADA would adequately cover claims of 
discrimination based on stuttering. 
A. Purpose of the ADA 
According to Congress, the ADA is meant to counter 
discrimination faced by people with disabilities who “have often 
had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.”47 
Congress found that discrimination against people with 
  
 43 Id. at 257 (citing M. Rice and R. Kroll, A Survey of Stutterers’ Perceptions 
of Challenges and Discrimination in the Workplace, in STUTTERING: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE FIRST WORLD CONGRESS ON FLUENCY DISORDERS, II 559 (C.W. Starkweather & 
H.F.M. Peters eds., 1994)). 
 44 Id. at 266. 
 45 Id. 
 46 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. II 2009). This note focuses on 
Title I, which deals with employment discrimination. Id. § 12112. There are two other main 
parts to the ADA. Title II prohibits discrimination in public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 
(2006). Title III proscribes discrimination in public accommodations. Id. § 12182. 
 47 Id. § 12101(a)(4). 
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disabilities was not only a historical problem but a problem 
that continues to affect American society in a “persist[ent]” and 
“pervasive” way, too often according people with disabilities “an 
inferior status in our society.”48 President George H. W. Bush 
stated that the ADA would “signal[] the end to the unjustified 
segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the 
mainstream of American life.”49 While the existing 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 had been effective, its area of 
coverage was limited and it “left broad areas of American life 
untouched or inadequately addressed.”50 
B. Framework of the ADA 
There are several steps to determining discrimination 
based on disability under the ADA.51 Courts apply the McDonell 
Douglas52 test, which is the standard for most discrimination 
litigation.53 To be successful, the employee must first satisfy 
three requirements to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination. First, the claimant must establish disability.54 
Under the ADA, there are three different ways an individual 
can show disability, any one of which is enough to establish 
that a disability exists.55 A plaintiff can establish the presence 
of a disability if the condition fits within the statutory 
  
 48 Id. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(3), (6). 
 49 President George H.W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, reprinted in 1 DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, PUBLIC LAW 
101-336, at 1166 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. et al. eds., 1992). 
 50 Id. at 1165. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first federal handicap 
discrimination statute. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-94a (2006). It had only a limited effect, 
though, because it applied just to the federal government, federal contractors, and 
federal grant recipients. Larry M. Schumaker, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 47 J. MO. B. 542, 542 (1991). Conversely, the ADA has a significantly wider 
impact on employment: it covers all public and private employers with fifteen or more 
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Congress defined disability under the ADA in the 
same way that handicap was defined in the Rehabilitation Act, and Congress expected 
the ADA definition to be applied consistently with the definition in the Rehabilitation 
Act. Schumaker, supra, at 543. While this note does not focus on the Rehabilitation Act 
because of the ADA’s wider scope, the Rehabilitation Act is relevant, and this note will 
refer to it and its case law where appropriate. 
 51 Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3294 DWF/SRN, 2004 WL 
2931346, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). 
 52 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 53 GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF 
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 37 (3d ed. 2010). In fact, the ADA was modeled on 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 229; Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 992 (2005). 
 54 Andresen, 2004 WL 2931346, at *4. 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2009). 
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definition of a disability—“a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more [of an individual’s] major 
life activities.”56 An employee can also establish the presence of 
a disability if there is “a record of such an impairment” as 
denoted in the above statutory definition.57 The third way an 
individual can show disability is if he or she is “regarded as 
having such an impairment.”58 Here, regarded as means that 
the employer (the person who took the adverse⎯and 
potentially discriminatory⎯employment action) is the one who 
is regarding (perceiving) the individual as having a disability 
(even if the person does not actually have a disability). 
Assuming that a claimant can establish that a disability exists 
under one of these three possibilities, the next part of the 
prima facie case requirement is to determine whether the 
person is “qualified to perform the essential functions of the 
job, with or without reasonable accommodation.”59 The third 
and final element necessary to establish a prima facie case is 
that the employee suffers an “adverse employment action” 
because of the disability.60 If the claimant can establish a prima 
facie case, a burden-shifting analysis ensues. The employer can 
rebut this presumption of discrimination “by articulating a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action.”61 If the employer can do this, the burden 
then shifts back to the plaintiff “to demonstrate that the 
employer’s non-discriminatory reason is pretextual.”62 
C. Stuttering Cases Under the ADA 
Several cases decided prior to the ADAAA held that 
stuttering is not a disability. The principal reason for this 
interpretation was that the plaintiffs failed to claim that 
stuttering was a significant obstacle in their lives. For 
example, in Zhong v. Tallahatchie General Hospital and 
  
 56 Id. § 12102(1)(A). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) regulations refer to this prong as “actual disability” in order to distinguish it 
from the other two prongs (not to suggest that this prong brings with it greater rights). 
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, As Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 16,980 (Mar. 25, 2011). This note will 
use this term where appropriate to avoid confusion. 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B). 
 58 Id. § 12102(1)(C). 
 59 Andresen, 2004 WL 2931346, at *4. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 62 Id. (quoting Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1135). 
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Extended Care Facility, a hospital said that it fired a medical 
technologist because he was incompetent.63 The fired employee 
filed several discrimination claims, one of which was an 
allegation that he was improperly terminated under the ADA 
because of his stutter.64 The District Court for the Northern 
District of Mississippi dismissed the claim because the 
plaintiff, in his deposition, described his stuttering as “very 
mild, very, very mild” and occurring “[o]nly occasionally.”65 
Plaintiff also testified that his stuttering did not affect his work 
and that he was able to perform his required tasks “‘without 
a[n] accommodation.’”66 In granting summary judgment to the 
defendant, the court stated that, based on plaintiff’s own 
testimony, plaintiff’s stuttering clearly did not substantially 
limit his ability to speak or work and, further, that he had not 
shown that defendant regarded him as having a disability.67 
The court in Preacely v. Schulte Roth & Zabel similarly 
held that stuttering is not a disability. There, a legal word 
processor was fired because the law-firm employer said that he 
“ma[de] his co-workers feel uncomfortable and unsafe” due to 
his inappropriate comments and drawings.68 The plaintiff 
claimed stuttering discrimination in violation of the ADA.69 In 
affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
law firm, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals highlighted that 
the former employee “admitted that his stutter was neither a 
physical nor a mental disability . . . and that it did not interfere 
with his ability to work or talk.”70 
The court’s decision in Detko v. Blimpies Restaurant 
also involved denial of a stuttering discrimination claim—
albeit under Title III of the ADA, which involves claims 
regarding discrimination by private entities in public 
accommodations, rather than a discrimination claim under 
Title I.71 The plaintiff, a customer of defendant Blimpies 
  
 63 Zhong v. Tallahatchie Gen. Hosp. & Extended Care Facility, No. 2:98CV44-
JAD, 1999 WL 33227442, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 28, 1999). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at *3. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Preacely v. Schulte Roth & Zabel, 17 F. App’x 57, 58 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 58-59. 
 71 Detko v. Blimpies Rest., 924 F. Supp. 555, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Detko is 
still relevant because the same definition of disability in Title I applies to Titles II and 
III of the ADA, and whether the plaintiff was disabled was the issue in the case. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2009). 
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Restaurant, filed a claim of discrimination on the basis of his 
stuttering after an incident that occurred when he attempted to 
order a sandwich in the restaurant.72 The facts, as alleged by the 
plaintiff, are particularly interesting. He claimed that he tried to 
order a sandwich with extra mayonnaise and stuttered on the 
word “mayonnaise.”73 The employee serving him, who turned out 
to be the store’s manager, yelled at him to “[h]urry it up,” and 
the customer “became embarrassed and distressed.”74 After the 
manager stopped preparing the customer’s sandwich, the 
customer asked to speak with the manager to file a complaint.75 
Meanwhile, another employee served the customer the 
sandwich.76 The manager refused to identify himself, threw the 
sandwich in the trash, grabbed the plaintiff “by the neck[,] and 
dragged him out of the restaurant.”77 The court granted 
Blimpie’s motion to dismiss because the customer did “not 
allege[] that his impediment substantially limit[ed] his 
speaking or that he is regarded as having such an 
impairment. . . . [H]e merely allege[d] that he stutters, and has 
particular difficulty with the letter ‘M.’”78 
In Zhong, Preacely, and Detko, the courts hearing the 
cases did not find stuttering to be a disability under the ADA. 
But, these results may be attributable to the fact that each of 
the three plaintiffs failed to allege that stuttering was a 
substantial limitation—or admitted outright that it was not. 
Thus, these plaintiffs do not appear to be exemplars by which 
to determine stuttering’s status under the ADA. 
The court in Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc. sent a strong 
signal that stuttering could be covered under the ADA if a 
plaintiff could demonstrate that her stuttering was severe.79 
Fuddruckers restaurant terminated the plaintiff’s employment 
after sixteen years of service.80 While the restaurant claimed that 
the former employee was fired for poor performance and for 
drooling and spitting into food, plaintiff “allege[d] that she was 
fired because she stutter[ed].”81 The court denied Fuddruckers’s 
  
 72 Detko, 924 F. Supp. at 556. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 557 (second emphasis added). 
 79 Andresen v. Fuddruckers, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3294 DWF/SRN, 2004 WL 
2931346, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2004). 
 80 Id. at *1. 
 81 Id. 
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motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of fact as 
to whether plaintiff’s “stuttering constitute[d] a ‘disability’ under 
the ADA.”82 Plaintiff claimed that her stuttering was severe, and 
that she avoided saying certain words and sounds and entering 
into speaking situations; she also alleged that she had difficulty 
speaking in general, especially when communicating with 
strangers and on the telephone, and that people had difficulty 
understanding her.83 A speech pathologist confirmed that her 
stuttering was severe.84 Also, the former employee sometimes had 
excess saliva that, according to her, only happened when she 
stuttered.85 Notwithstanding her stuttering and saliva issues, 
Andresen enjoyed a lengthy, successful term of employment with 
Fuddruckers until new managers took over the restaurant.86 
Plaintiff’s “evidence [was] sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact that her stuttering [was] severe and that it substantially 
limit[ed] her ability to speak.”87 In its analysis, the court examined 
Zhong and Preacely and distinguished them on their facts. Those 
precedents did “not persuade the Court that [plaintiff’s] stuttering 
[could not], as a matter of law, constitute a disability.”88 The court 
also determined “that a triable issue of fact exist[ed] as to 
whether Andresen was qualified to do her job . . . [and] whether 
she was terminated because of her stuttering.”89 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(Commission or EEOC) decision in Manning v. United States 
Postal Service also demonstrates that stuttering can be 
considered a disability.90 The complainant, Robert Manning, 
described his stuttering as severe.91 He said that he could not 
speak in public and was embarrassed to take classes.92 Manning 
claimed that he noticed derogatory graffiti on the stalls in two 
men’s restrooms: the writing mocked his stuttering.93 Although 
Manning noticed the graffiti in late winter or early spring 2000 
  
 82 Id. at *6, *8. 
 83 Id. at *1. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at *1-3. 
 87 Id. at *6. 
 88 Id. at *6 & n.10 (noting that the plaintiffs in Zhong and Preacely both 
admitted that they do not stutter frequently). 
 89 Id. at *6-7. 
 90 Manning, E.E.O.C. Dec. 01A42153, 2004 WL 1810386, at *1 (Aug. 5, 2004). 
This case was before the Commission under the Rehabilitation Act, as Manning worked 
for a federal agency. Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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and discussed the matter with his supervisor, the graffiti was 
not cleaned off until October 27, 2000.94 It then reappeared and 
remained on the walls until the complainant left the Postal 
Service in March 2001.95 A psychiatric evaluation stated that 
Manning only stuttered mildly,96 but the Commission reversed 
the administrative judge’s ruling of a decision without a 
hearing.97 The Commission found a “genuine issue of material 
fact” as to whether the complainant was “substantially limited 
in the major life activity of speaking.”98 According to the 
Commission, a hearing was not only necessary to resolve the 
issue of fact, but it was crucial: the hearing would give the 
administrative law judge an opportunity to hear how Manning 
stuttered.99  
This finding connotes the individualized inquiry that 
would be done were stuttering considered solely under a 
disability theory; stuttering would not be a disability for every 
person who stutters, but only if it substantially affects that 
person’s speaking.100 So, while not yet finding that Manning’s 
stuttering substantially limited his speaking, the Commission 
noted that his stuttering could be deemed substantially limiting 
if the facts at the hearing bore that out.101 The Commission 
further ruled that Manning could possibly be covered under the 
regarded-as prong of the definition of disability⎯which protects 
against discrimination based on stereotypes⎯if further facts 
demonstrated this.102 The Commission noted that stuttering is a 
condition that is characterized by stigmatizing stereotypes and 
“attitudinal barriers” that can affect a stutterer’s employment 
opportunities.103 These stereotypes include the beliefs that people 
who stutter are “nervous, shy, quiet, self-conscious, withdrawn, 
tense, anxious, fearful and guarded.”104 In sum, then, considering 
these pre-ADAAA cases, courts only found stuttering to be a 
disability when the physical component of stuttering severely 
  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at *2. 
 97 Id. at *3. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at *3-4. Note that under the ADAAA, as explained infra, a claimant can 
meet the requirements for the regarded-as prong without showing that he or she was 
regarded as being substantially limited in a major life activity. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 103 Manning, 2004 WL 1810386, at *4. 
 104 Id. 
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affected an individual. In part, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the ADA required this narrow definition of 
disability, as discussed in the next section. 
D. Supreme Court Cases Limiting the Definition of 
Disability Under the ADA 
1. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 
In Sutton, the Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether corrective or mitigating measures must be considered 
when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity, the first prong of the ADA test for determining 
whether a disability exists.105 The case arose after two sisters 
applied for employment with United Air Lines as commercial 
airline pilots.106 Both sisters had severe myopia; their eyesight was 
poor enough that without corrective lenses, they could not 
participate in numerous daily activities.107 However, with glasses 
or contact lenses, they could see as well as people who did not 
have impaired eyesight.108 After United Air Lines initially invited 
them for an interview, it realized that they did not meet the 
company’s minimum uncorrected vision requirement.109 United 
Air Lines subsequently canceled the interview, and the sisters 
filed suit, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA.110 
They specifically claimed that “they actually [had] a substantially 
limiting impairment or [were] regarded as having such an 
impairment.”111 The district court and the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit found that they had not stated a claim of disability 
within the meaning of the ADA.112 
The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to the first 
claim and held that if a person is taking measures to correct or 
mitigate an impairment, the effects of those measures “must be 
taken into account when judging whether that person is 
‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus 
‘disabled’ under the Act.”113 To reach this result, the Court 
  
 105 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. 
 106 Id. at 475. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 476. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 476-77. 
 113 Id. at 477, 482 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006)). 
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looked to three separate provisions of the ADA.114 The Court 
first reasoned that the phrase substantially limits applies to 
the present, so that a “person whose physical or mental 
impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does 
not have an impairment that presently ‘substantially limits’ a 
major life activity.”115 Next, the Court reasoned that because a 
determination of disability under the ADA is an “individualized 
inquiry,” judges should examine an individual based on that 
person’s actual condition, not general information on how a 
group of people with the same impairment is usually affected.116 
For the individualized analysis to be accurate, the Court noted 
that judges must consider a person’s use of mitigating 
measures.117 Finally, the Court looked at the number of people 
with disabilities that Congress cited in the ADA—forty-three 
million—to conclude that the legislature intended to take a 
“functional approach to determining disability” rather than a 
nonfunctional approach.118 Therefore, because the plaintiffs 
wore corrective lenses, they could not successfully make a 
claim that they were substantially limited in any major life 
activity.119 The Court in Sutton also provided a strict standard 
for the regarded-as prong of the disability definition. In order 
to be regarded as disabled, the Court held, the employer must 
regard the claimant substantially limited in a major life 
activity; thus, even under the regarded-as prong, substantial 
limitation is the standard for disability.120 
2. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams 
Toyota further limits the definition of disability under 
the ADA. In Toyota, the Supreme Court needed to interpret the 
terms substantially and major to determine whether a person 
  
 114 Id. at 482. 
 115 Id. at 482-83. 
 116 Id. at 483. 
 117 Id. at 483-84. 
 118 Id. at 484-87. The functional approach does not include people who 
successfully use mitigating measures to overcome their limitations. Id. at 485. The 
nonfunctional approach, also known as the “health conditions approach,” “looks at all 
conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an individual.” Id. at 
485, 487. Using this approach, over 160 million Americans would be considered 
disabled. Id. at 487. 
 119 Id. at 488-89. 
 120 Id. at 491, 493. 
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was disabled under the ADA.121 The case involved Ella 
Williams, who had been employed in an automobile 
manufacturing plant by Toyota Motor Manufacturing 
(Toyota).122 Over the course of several years, Williams developed 
pain and was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and 
several other conditions.123 This made it difficult for her to 
continue working at Toyota.124 After Williams’s employment 
was terminated, she filed suit against her former employer, 
claiming that Toyota violated the ADA.125 Williams claimed that 
she was disabled because her physical impairments 
substantially limited her in six ways,126 each of which she 
claimed was a major life activity.127 She also alleged that she 
was disabled under the ADA because she had a record of 
impairment and because she was regarded as having an 
impairment.128 While the district court ruled in favor of Toyota, 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and found 
that Williams was disabled because she had been substantially 
limited in performing manual tasks.129 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari “to consider the proper standard for 
assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in 
performing manual tasks.”130 
In deciding to strictly interpret both substantially and 
major, the Supreme Court reversed.131 The Court reasoned that 
these terms must be interpreted strictly, in part because of 
Congress’s intent, as discussed in Sutton.132 In order to be 
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, the Court 
held that “an individual must have an impairment that 
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing 
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives [and that t]he impairment’s impact must also be 
  
 121 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002), 
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553, as recognized in Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 582 F. Supp. 2d 326, 
341 & n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 122 Id. at 187. 
 123 Id. at 187-89. 
 124 Id. at 189-90. 
 125 Id. at 190. 
 126 Williams claimed that her physical impairments substantially limited her in 
manual tasks, housework, gardening, playing with her children, lifting, and working. Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 190-92. 
 130 Id. at 192. 
 131 Id. at 192, 196-97. 
 132 Id. at 197. 
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permanent or long term.”133 Taking into account the 
individualized inquiry required by the statute, and also the fact 
that symptoms can “vary widely from person to person” with 
certain impairments, the Court reasoned that mere evidence of 
a medical diagnosis would be “insufficient . . . to prove 
disability status;” rather, whether a person has a disability 
under the ADA must be based upon the extent of that 
individual’s impairment.134 When analyzing the major life 
activity of performing manual tasks, the Court stated that the 
main question must be whether the individual “is unable to 
perform the variety of tasks central to most people’s daily 
lives,” not just the tasks associated with that person’s specific 
job.135 This was a crucial point because “the manual tasks 
unique to any particular job are not necessarily important 
parts of most people’s lives.”136 In this case, there were some 
manual tasks that Williams was able to do at work, and 
outside of work she was able to perform many of the manual 
tasks that are central to most people’s daily lives.137 Therefore, 
the court of appeals was incorrect to find that Williams was 
disabled under the ADA.138 
III. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT 
In response to how the ADA had been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Sutton and Toyota, Congress passed the 
ADA Amendments Act in 2008.139 The Amendments Act 
significantly broadened the scope of disability under the ADA.140 
After expanding on Congress’s purpose in passing the ADAAA, 
this part details the specific changes in the ADAAA and 
discusses how each of the changes affects discrimination claims 
brought on the basis of stuttering. Taken as a whole, the 
ADAAA decreases plaintiffs’ burdens to show that their 
stuttering is a disability. 
  
 133 Id. at 198. 
 134 Id. at 198-99. 
 135 Id. at 200-01. 
 136 Id. at 201. 
 137 Id. at 202. 
 138 Id. at 203. 
 139 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promulgated amended regulations as 
well, which became effective on May 24, 2011. Regulations to Implement the Equal 
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, As Amended, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 16,978, 16,978 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
 140 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4, 122 Stat. at 3555. 
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A. Congressional Purpose 
One of the major purposes of the ADAAA was to place 
the emphasis of ADA claims on whether a qualified person has 
been discriminated against on the basis of disability, rather 
than on the preliminary question of whether a plaintiff is 
disabled.141 Congress deemed the definition of disability less 
important than the determination of whether covered entities 
complied with their obligations not to discriminate.142 The 
amended statute embraces a wider-encompassing meaning of 
disability, defining the term “in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals.”143 Congress removed two original findings from the 
ADA because they provided a justification for the Supreme 
Court to narrowly construe the definition of disability144: (1) 
that there are forty-three million Americans with disabilities,145 
and (2) that individuals with disabilities constitute “a discrete 
and insular minority.”146 Removing the findings enlarges the 
class of individuals that the statute is intended to protect and, 
by extension, allows for an increasing number of impairments 
to be considered disabilities.147 Moreover, the old ADA 
prohibited discrimination against a qualified individual “with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual,”148 while 
the ADAAA prohibits discrimination against a qualified 
individual “on the basis of disability.”149 Therefore, the major 
purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for individuals to be 
  
 141 Id. at 3554; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (2011) (“The primary object of 
attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have 
complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the 
individual meets the definition of disability. The question of whether an individual meets 
the definition of disability under this part should not demand extensive analysis.”). 
 142 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554. 
 143 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. II 2009). 
 144 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3, 122 Stat. at 3554-55. 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). 
 146 Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
 147 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553 (“[L]ower courts 
have incorrectly found in individual cases that people with a range of substantially 
limiting impairments are not people with disabilities . . . .”). 
 148 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
 149 Id. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009). This (subtle) change in language⎯specifically, 
the removal of “with a disability”⎯further demonstrates the way Congress wanted courts 
to more easily dispense with the question of whether an individual is disabled. 
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW DISABILITY AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION LAWS 2008, at 23 
(Joyce Gentry et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING]. In fact, this language was 
structured on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. 
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considered disabled under the statute.150 In and of itself, this 
legislative purpose makes it more likely that individuals who 
stutter will be protected by the ADAAA. 
B. Specific Changes Under the ADAAA and How They 
Relate to Stuttering 
The amendments made numerous changes to the ADA. 
The changes affect several areas: the definition of substantially 
limits, episodic impairments and impairments in remission, 
which activities are considered major life activities, effects of 
mitigating measures, and the requirements of the regarded-as 
prong. Each of these changes has substantial implications 
regarding the extent to which stuttering is considered a disability 
under the ADA. 
1. Speaking as a Major Life Activity 
No major life activities were listed in the old ADA.151 The 
amended statute, though, provides a nonexhaustive list of 
activities.152 Under the ADAAA, speaking is explicitly listed as a 
major life activity.153 In our society, a limitation on one’s ability 
to speak can interfere with life activities in which people 
without such limitations regularly engage. Speaking plays a 
vital role in communication. If there was any doubt as to the 
significance of speaking in people’s daily lives, the statute now 
removes the ambiguity. Further, because of the “substantially 
limits” requirement, it would not make sense for the statute to 
only cover a total inability to speak⎯i.e., muteness. For many 
people who stutter, their speech impediment substantially 
limits—but does not preclude—their ability to speak. Therefore, 
the inclusion of speaking as a major life activity would make it 
easier for stuttering to be considered a disability under the ADA. 
  
 150 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554 (stating that the 
purpose of the amendments is “to carry out the ADA’s objectives . . . by reinstating a 
broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA”). 
 151 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (disability is defined, but no list is given); 
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 149, at 21. The EEOC did promulgate a regulatory definition, 
though, and speaking was on that list. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2010) (amended 2011). 
 152 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
 153 Id. 
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2. Substantially Limits: A Less Demanding Standard 
The ADAAA establishes that the substantially limits 
requirement was to be construed significantly more broadly 
than courts had been interpreting the term.154 Moreover, there 
are three specific ways in which substantially limits has 
become a more inclusive standard. 
First, only one major life activity needs to be 
substantially limited for an individual to have a cognizable 
disability under the ADAAA.155 Therefore, it would suffice if 
stuttering substantially limited speaking without substantially 
limiting any other major life activity. 
Second, the amended statute provides coverage for 
impairments that are episodic or in remission, so long as they 
fit the statutory definition of disability when they are active.156 
A useful test for determining if an individual’s impairment is 
substantially limiting is whether an individual’s activities are 
limited in “condition, duration and manner.”157 Stuttering could 
be considered episodic because of how the physical stuttering 
block does not occur constantly. Sometimes, a person does not 
physically stutter for long periods of time; there may be days or 
more between stutters.158 This person who stutters only 
intermittently would likely be covered under this amendment. 
When a person is stuttering, the involuntary interruptions can 
substantially limit one’s ability to speak. 
Third, the ADAAA states that the use or lack of use of 
mitigating or corrective measures cannot be taken into account 
  
 154 Id. § 12102(4)(B) (Supp. II 2009) (“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be 
interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008.”); ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554. Specifically, one purpose 
of the amendments is to convey congressional intent that the standard for 
“substantially limits” as articulated in Toyota “has created an inappropriately high 
level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA.” Id. Additionally, 
Congress found that the EEOC regulations that defined “‘substantially limits’ as 
‘significantly restricted’ are inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too 
high a standard.” Id. 
 155 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C) (Supp. II 2009) (“An impairment that substantially 
limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be 
considered a disability.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(viii) (2011). This is the same as under 
the original ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006). 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is 
a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vii). 
 157 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 149, at 18. 
 158 See Hood & Roach, supra note 16. 
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when determining whether or not a person has a disability.159 
The statute lists various mitigating measures that cannot be 
considered: (1) medication and medical supplies and equipment, 
(2) assistive technology, (3) reasonable accommodations or 
auxiliary aids or services, or (4) learned behavioral or adaptive 
neurological modifications.160 
There are several ways—including speech therapy161 and 
use of assistive devices162—people can attempt to mitigate their 
stuttering. One of the reasons this provision is so important in 
relation to stuttering is that each of these measures has 
varying levels of effectiveness for each person who uses them. 
Just as the cause of stuttering is not understood, what makes 
these methods effective is also not understood. In this way, it is 
not a person’s fault if these measures do not work to reduce a 
person’s stuttering.163 In turn, it would be unfair if the 
availability of mitigating factors weighed against considering 
stuttering a disability; this would harm those people on whom 
these techniques were not effective. Furthermore, some people 
who stutter do not believe in using these methods, and it would 
be unfortunate to create a situation where—because stuttering 
could not be recognized as a disability—there is more pressure 
on people who stutter to use these measures because there 
would be no other recourse in the workplace. 
3. Regarded-As Prong Changed 
The ADA amendments both broaden and narrow the 
scope of coverage under the regarded-as prong of disability. A 
person can now be regarded as having a disability if this 
  
 159 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (“The determination of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the 
ameliorative effects of [numerous enumerated] mitigating measures . . . .”); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(vi); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554 
(explicitly noting a purpose of the amendments to reject Sutton, which had held that 
impairments need to be determined with regard to mitigating measures). 
 160 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV). Ordinary eyeglasses and contact lenses, 
though, can be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits 
a major life activity. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(ii). 
 161 See JEZER, supra note 7, at 68, 76 (noting that there are two different 
major approaches to speech therapy, but explaining that “what works in the clinic 
doesn’t easily carry over into the real world”). 
 162 The SpeechEasy is one such tool. What Is SpeechEasy?, SPEECHEASY, 
http://www.speecheasy.com/whatisspeecheasy.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). It looks like a 
hearing aid and “mimics the choral effect paired with traditional fluency techniques.” Id.; 
How It Works, SPEECHEASY, http://www.speecheasy.com/whatisspeecheasy.php (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
 163 See Stuttering Info, What Causes Stuttering?, supra note 4. 
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individual can show discrimination based on an actual or 
perceived impairment, even if the impairment does not limit—
or is not perceived to limit—a major life activity.164 In this way, 
Congress reinstated the reasoning of School Board of Nassau 
County, Florida v. Arline.165 
In Arline, an elementary-school teacher was fired after 
she suffered a third relapse of tuberculosis in the span of two 
years.166 She brought suit, claiming a violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act.167 The Supreme Court found that she was a 
person with a handicap under the regarded-as prong.168 Under 
that part of the definition, the “negative reactions of others” to 
an impairment can limit a person’s ability to work.169 In 
explaining the regarded-as prong, the Court looked to 
congressional intent to reason that “society’s accumulated myths 
and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as 
are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.”170 
Coverage under the regarded-as prong was narrowed 
under the amendments, though, in two ways. First, 
impairments that are transitory and minor are not covered 
under the regarded-as prong.171 Stuttering is permanent, so it 
would not be restricted by this provision. Second, and more 
importantly in this context, the ADAAA does not require 
reasonable accommodations to be made for people who only fit 
the definition of disability under the regarded-as prong.172 This 
part of the statute resolved a circuit split over whether the 
third prong required reasonable accommodations.173 
  
 164 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (“An individual meets the requirement of ‘being 
regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has 
been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or 
perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity.” (emphasis added)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). 
 165 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2, 122 Stat. 
at 3554 (articulating a purpose of the amendments to reject Sutton’s interpretation of 
the regarded-as prong and reinstate the reasoning in Arline). 
 166 Arline, 480 U.S. at 276. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 284-86. 
 169 Id. at 283. 
 170 Id. at 284. 
 171 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (Supp. II 2009) (defining transitory as being six 
months or less); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (2011). But, a transitory impairment can fit the 
definition of disability under the actual-disability prong or the record-of prong. Id. 
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ix). 
 172 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(e). Because of this, the EEOC 
noted that it is unnecessary to proceed under the actual-disability or record-of prong 
when an individual is not seeking a reasonable accommodation; the analysis could then 
be made solely under the regarded-as prong. Id. § 1630.2(g)(3). 
 173 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 149, at 24-25. 
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This is quite significant in relation to stuttering because 
it addresses the reality that there may be less protection for 
people who do not stutter frequently under the actual-disability 
prong of disability.174 Under this provision, if a person who 
stutters is discriminated against because of stuttering, this 
individual can be regarded as having a disability⎯even if 
courts would not consider stuttering as limiting the person’s 
speaking. This provision seems to allow people who do not 
stutter frequently to nevertheless gain protection against 
discrimination. Furthermore, and quite significantly, this may 
be incentive for people who choose to hide their stuttering⎯by 
avoiding speaking situations⎯to speak up, with the knowledge 
that (even based on just a few physical blocks) any 
discrimination can have a legal remedy. 
C. ADAAA Case Law 
In Medvic v. Compass Sign Co., LLC, a Title I case 
analyzed under the ADAAA, plaintiff’s claim of discrimination 
based on stuttering survived defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.175 The plaintiff, Donald Medvic, was employed as a 
sheet-metal mechanic for the defendant, Compass Signs.176 
Medvic stuttered, and, although he never asked for an 
accommodation, his supervisors were aware of his speech 
impediment because they could hear it.177 Medvic was laid off, and 
he brought two claims against Compass Signs based on the 
ADA—that his termination was due to his stuttering disability, 
and that he was subjected to a hostile work environment.178 In 
evaluating Compass Signs’s summary-judgment motion, the 
court first analyzed whether Medvic was disabled under the 
  
 174 The reason for this is that infrequent stuttering may not be viewed as a 
substantial limit on speaking. See supra Part I. 
 175 Medvic v. Compass Sign Co., LLC, Civ. A. No. 10-5222, 2011 WL 3513499, 
at *1, *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2011). 
 176 Id. at *1. 
 177 Id. at *1-2. The court described Medvic’s stutter as making it difficult for 
him to communicate orally and sometimes causing him to be unable to say what he 
wants to say for several minutes. Id. at *1. Medvic’s coworkers, at least once, needed to 
help him order food while out for dinner. Id. at *2. Medvic accused his supervisors of 
making fun of his stuttering. Specifically, he claimed they asked him to sing for them 
and would tell him to just spit it out. Id. at *3. But Medvic said that his stutter did not 
affect his ability to do his job, and the defendant agreed; once, Medvic’s supervisors 
considered warning a customer about his stuttering, but they ultimately chose not to 
do so because he “always found his way.” Id. 
 178 Id. at *1. 
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terms of the ADAAA.179 The court found that there was a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether Medvic was substantially limited in 
communicating: stuttering sometimes delayed his speech for 
minutes at a time, stuttering impeded his social life, he stuttered 
during his deposition, and his coworkers testified to his 
stuttering hindering his ability to communicate.180 The company 
argued that, because Medvic sat for his deposition, he could not 
have been substantially limited in his ability to communicate, 
but the court rejected this argument.181 The court maintained that 
Medvic could still be substantially limited in communicating 
even if he could communicate effectively sometimes.182 The court 
cited the ADAAA for further support.183 Then, the court found 
that Medvic also survived summary judgment regarding whether 
he was otherwise qualified for the job and whether the company’s 
action was taken because of his stuttering.184 
IV. BRINGING A WORKPLACE STUTTERING DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIM UNDER THE AMENDED ADA 
The ADAAA was intended to make it easier for 
claimants to show that they have a disability under the 
statutory definition of that term. The amendments do make it 
easier for stutterers to show that they have a disability. This 
part methodically goes through the statute to document how a 
successful stuttering discrimination claim can be brought 
under the ADAAA. The analysis will show how applying the 
complex nature of stuttering to the definition of disability 
under the ADAAA can result in broad antidiscrimination 
coverage for people who stutter. Significantly, one way to 
address this problem of the emotional aspect of stuttering is to 
demonstrate that even an infrequent overt stutterer can be 
considered substantially limited in speaking. In fact, this part 
will focus on this type of stutterer because of the law’s 
heretofore lack of attention to this area. Still, there are 
  
 179 Id. at *5-7. 
 180 Id. at *6-7. The court seems to stress that Medvic stuttered frequently and 
with great struggle, “at times rendering him incapable of verbally communicating for 
himself.” Id. at *7. The court referred to the ADAAA: it noted that Medvic took medicine 
to help him stutter less but that mitigating measures must not be considered, and it 
explained that his stutter is substantially limiting even though it is episodic. Id. at *7. 
 181 Id. at *7. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. The court pointed to the ADAAA here to demonstrate that Congress 
intended to broaden protections. Id. 
 184 Id. at *7-10. 
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shortcomings of coverage in approaching stuttering as a 
disability. 
A. Establishing Stuttering as a Disability Under the 
ADAAA 
1. Stuttering Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity 
Under the ADAAA, a person who stutters may be able 
to show that stuttering substantially limits speaking, a major 
life activity under the Act. This would be an individualized 
inquiry. But for the inquiry to be proper, it would need to take 
into account both the physical and the emotional aspects of 
stuttering. With respect to the physical aspect, the law already 
accounts for a certain sect of the stuttering population.185 People 
who stutter frequently should be able to show that their 
disfluencies are substantially limiting, while people who 
stutter infrequently would not be able show that their speech 
impediments substantially limit their speaking. 
The law, however, has not accounted for the emotional 
aspect of stuttering. Nevertheless, stutterers who are greatly 
affected by the emotional aspect of stuttering should also be 
able to show that they are substantially limited in a major life 
activity. Stuttering can be quite debilitating for an individual, 
even if an outside listener does not hear many physical 
stuttered words.186 This mental struggle, while less overt, can 
nevertheless be substantially limiting. Significantly, the ADA 
does cover mental disabilities in addition to physical 
disabilities.187 Like certain forms of mental illness, stuttering is 
sometimes not readily apparent to the outside observer.188 
Coverage for these types of stutterers is not only necessary to 
seriously deal with stuttering, but it is also practical, as it is 
possible to gauge the extent to which a stutterer is emotionally 
affected by stuttering. Significantly, and rather than relying 
upon the plaintiff’s testimony, there is a way for speech 
pathologists to assess stuttering’s full impact on a person’s 
quality of life⎯an assessment instrument known as the 
Overall Assessment of the Speaker’s Experience of Stuttering 
  
 185 See supra Parts II & III. 
 186 See supra Part I. 
 187 See supra Part II. 
 188 While this note is not attempting to equate mental illness with stuttering, 
the ADA does cover mental disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. II 2009). 
1204 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
(OASES).189 Using the OASES would add a measure of 
objectivity and uniformity to the task of assessing the 
emotional impact of stuttering on one’s life. Although this type 
of stutterer may be less likely to be discriminated against 
because this person’s physical stuttering is infrequent, 
qualifying as disabled is nevertheless important because it 
would allow for reasonable accommodations.190 
2. Regarded as Disabled 
The third way to establish a disability⎯the regarded-as 
prong⎯was included in the ADA to protect disabilities not 
noticeable to the naked eye. Therefore, it is especially relevant to 
stuttering. This provision was first included in the 
Rehabilitation Act to protect employees who were discriminated 
against whether or not they were recognized as handicapped 
under the definition of the statute.191 In Arline, the Supreme 
Court interpreted this provision to include an expansive 
definition of perceived handicaps, finding that Congress was 
concerned with “protecting individuals from discrimination 
based on outdated and stereotypic laws and attitudes.”192 
The third prong and its interpretation in Arline are 
crucial to protecting claimants who suffer from a disability that 
is perceived based on untrue stereotypes. So many of the 
problems facing people who stutter are based on false 
stereotypes and myths. Therefore, even if an employee is not 
substantially limited by stuttering, his or her employer might 
perceive the employee as being substantially limited because of 
the prevalence of these preconceived notions of stuttering. In 
this way, the regarded-as prong adds a significant layer of 
protection to those who face discrimination on the basis of 
stuttering. If, for example, a person is an infrequent stutterer, 
the speech impediment may not be too bothersome, and this 
  
 189 See generally Yaruss, supra note 36 (explaining this kind of evaluation). 
 190 Returning to the plaintiffs in Zhong, Preacely, and Detko, perhaps they 
would have fit into this category of individuals. We do not know, but they could have 
been given a quality-of-life assessment. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. It 
is also strange that these plaintiffs would downplay the limiting nature of the very 
impairment on which they were bringing their disability lawsuit. Perhaps they were 
covering⎯downplaying their speech difficulties in order to seem more normal. See 
infra notes 226, 228 and accompanying text. 
 191 Allison Ara, Comment, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Do the 
Amendments Cure the Interpretation Problems of Perceived Disabilities?, 50 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 255, 258 (2010). 
 192 Id. at 258-59. 
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person may not be substantially limited in speaking. But, if an 
employer hears this individual stutter and discriminates on 
that basis because of a stereotype associated with stuttering, 
this person would have a claim under the regarded-as prong. 
This employee would not be entitled to a reasonable 
accommodation, but if this individual stutters infrequently and 
is not bothered by stuttering, it is unlikely that any 
accommodation would even be desired.  
Another instance of the regarded-as prong applying to 
stuttering is if a person stutters frequently but is not bothered 
by his or her stuttering. Such an individual would not be 
substantially limited in speaking because this person would not 
view stuttering as limiting. But, this person may still face 
discrimination based on stuttering. Although this employee 
may fail to qualify as a person with a disability under prong 
one, prong three should provide coverage: this individual is 
regarded as being disabled even though the individual does not 
view stuttering like this. No accommodation would be 
requested in this situation, as the employee would not feel 
limited in speaking. This should not be a catchall for truly 
severe stutterers, though. While it would be a fallback option, a 
severe stutterer should attempt to show disability under prong 
one so that he or she is entitled to reasonable accommodations. 
B. Determining a Qualified Individual 
Once a claimant can establish disability under the 
terms of the ADAAA, this person must then be able to show the 
requisite qualifications for the position at issue.193 “The term 
‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions 
of the employment position . . . .”194 Deference is given to the 
employer in determining which job functions are essential.195 
People who stutter may find themselves in a “catch-22” 
situation when speaking or possessing excellent communication 
skills is an essential job requirement196: “If they prove they are 
‘substantially impaired’ in speaking, they will not be ‘qualified’ 
for the job.”197 “On the other hand, if they prove that they are 
  
 193 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 194 Id. § 12111(8). 
 195 Id.  
 196 Parry, supra note 9. 
 197 Id. 
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‘qualified’ to hold a speaking job, they will not be ‘substantially 
limited’ . . . .”198 Either way, as the reasoning goes, such a 
claimant would likely fail to make a prima facie showing of 
discrimination if he or she is subject to an adverse employment 
action.199 While this is a serious concern, it need not always be 
true. Note that it may be easier for infrequent stutterers who 
demonstrate that they are regarded as being disabled to show 
that they are qualified for the job because there is no possible 
catch-22 in that situation. At the same time, though, these 
employees would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 
C. What Kinds of Accommodations Are Reasonable? 
It is next necessary to examine what would be considered 
a reasonable accommodation that an employer could make for 
an employee who stutters.200 Under its definition in the statute, a 
reasonable accommodation can include “job restructuring” and 
“reassignment to a vacant position,”201 but the accommodation 
cannot pose an “undue hardship” to the employer.202 
There are several possible reasonable accommodations for 
people who stutter. Presumably, if a person who stutters is 
uncomfortable because the job involves a lot of speaking (e.g., if 
this person is often on the telephone, needs to make 
presentations, or is required to meet with clients), it may be a 
reasonable accommodation for an employer to assign the 
employee to another position that involves less speaking, or 
perhaps change the current position to require less speaking. This 
may make both the employer and the employee more comfortable. 
Another example of a reasonable accommodation would be 
moving an employee’s desk to a less crowded part of the office so 
that it is easier for the employee to speak on the phone.203 
A major issue regarding accommodations is disclosure. 
Employees with disabilities that are not visibly apparent need to 
disclose these disabilities to employers to be eligible for reasonable 
accommodations. If an employer does not know about a disability, 
the employer cannot possibly make any accommodations.  
  
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). 
 201 Id. § 12111(9)(B). 
 202 Id. § 12111(10). 
 203 Beth Bienvenu, The Only Thing We Have to Fear Is . . . The Perfect Job: 
Tips for Getting (and Keeping) a Job, STUTTERING HOMEPAGE (Sept. 9, 2006), 
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/isad9/papers/bienvenu9.html. 
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Stuttering is one such disability that may not be readily 
apparent to supervisors. If a person is a covert stutterer or an 
infrequent overt stutterer who is uncomfortable enough with 
stuttering that this person would like the employer to make a 
reasonable accommodation, it is also likely that the person is 
uncomfortable with the idea of disclosing the stuttering. A 
stutterer may be reluctant to tell an employer about his 
stuttering because of the myths and stereotypes that pervade the 
public’s understanding about stuttering. Certainly, if someone is a 
covert stutterer, it is the fear and shame associated with 
stuttering that is keeping this person in the shell.  
Here again is a link with mental illness. Stigma and fear 
of mental disorders make disclosure to employers risky, and 
“[p]oor self-awareness or self-denial may also make disclosure 
difficult.”204 Disclosure is “deliberate” and often “wrenching” for 
people with psychiatric disorders.205 Perhaps ironically, 
considering the purpose of the ADA, people with psychiatric 
disorders fear disclosing their impairments due to stigma and 
discrimination; by telling their employer about their condition, 
such an individual “risks discrimination, teasing or harassment, 
isolation, [and] stigmatizing assumptions about her ability.”206  
Conversely, disclosure may be a positive step for people 
with psychiatric disabilities, as it “may enhance self-esteem, 
diminish shame, permit coworkers and others to offer support, 
and even empower another individual’s revelation.”207 This 
assessment of the positives and negatives of disclosure by 
people with mental disabilities echoes the dilemma faced by 
many covert or mild stutterers.208 If these individuals choose to 
disclose, they may be entitled to accommodations, but they 
must also come out of their stuttering shells. Ultimately, many 
mild stutterers probably choose to suffer in silence. If they do 
not discuss their stuttering with their family and friends, it is 
probably unlikely that they would choose to do so with their 
  
 204 Christopher G. Bell, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental 
Disability, and Work, in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 203, 212 
(Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds., 1997). 
 205 Laura Lee Hall, Making the ADA Work for People with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
in MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW, supra note 204, at 241, 258. 
 206 Id. at 259. 
 207 Id. at 260. 
 208 Such a comparison is by no means precise because stuttering is not a 
psychiatric disability. It is relevant only inasmuch as mental disabilities and 
sometimes stuttering would not be readily apparent to an employer. See supra Part I. 
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bosses.209 And, if they do not choose to disclose, they should not 
shirk any of their duties.210 Failure to disclose and discuss 
reasonable accommodations with an employer combined with 
failure to fulfill the duties of the job means that an employee 
can be fired and left without any recourse under the ADA. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF STUTTERING DISCRIMINATION 
BASED ON IDENTITY RATHER THAN DISABILITY 
Another way to proscribe discrimination on the basis of 
stuttering is to view stuttering itself in a different way⎯not as 
a disability, but as an identity characteristic. This part 
discusses the ways stuttering is different from what is usually 
considered a disability. It then introduces several theories that 
demonstrate how stuttering might not be considered a 
disability. This different way of looking at stuttering⎯as an 
identity trait, not as a disability⎯can be covered under 
antidiscrimination law under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.211 There are both advantages and disadvantages to 
coverage of stuttering under Title VII. Among the advantages 
is a second way to account for the emotional aspect of 
stuttering; if all stutterers are covered under law, the problem 
of the infrequent physical stutterer is abrogated. Another 
advantage is that explicit statutory coverage of stuttering 
discrimination would eliminate the need under the ADA to 
show that stuttering is a disability and that the individual is 
qualified for the job. Quite significantly, a further advantage is 
that such a personhood characterization of stuttering may help 
to empower people who stutter. Among the disadvantages are 
that, under Title VII, there would be no accommodations for 
stutterers, and the statute may be overinclusive and 
unrealistic. 
A. Viewing Stuttering as Something Other than a 
Disability 
While enforcement against discrimination based on 
stuttering can be analyzed through disability jurisprudence, 
there is another way to approach this type of discrimination. 
  
 209 Note that someone who stutters only infrequently would only be entitled to 
a reasonable accommodation if it was established that the emotional aspect of 
stuttering is considered a substantial limitation on speaking. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 210 Parry, supra note 9. 
 211 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2006).  
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There is something strange about viewing stuttering as a 
disability. It is not as though stutterers cannot speak or cannot 
express themselves. They are physically able to say whatever 
they want to say; what makes stutterers different from 
nonstutterers is that it takes them longer to say things. This is 
unlike what one usually considers a disability, when a disabled 
person is completely unable to do a certain activity.212 While it 
is true that stutterers cannot speak quickly, there is very 
rarely any need to speak so quickly. Rather, it is society that 
has determined that it is normal to speak without involuntary 
interruptions and that it is therefore inferior to speak with 
these interruptions.213 The theories of acceptance, transfluency, 
and covering do much to inform this discussion. 
Although stutterers commonly feel ashamed of their 
stuttering and view it as a terrible burden, a growing number 
of people who stutter are growing to accept it.214 This self-
acceptance can begin with the realization that this is how one 
talks and that one cannot ever fully change it.215 With this in 
mind, acceptance can offer the option of a more self-fulfilling 
and life-affirming mindset for people who stutter because it 
eliminates the “shame, guilt and embarrassment that makes 
speaking difficult.”216 Note that, under this philosophy, it is the 
negative feelings that make speaking hard, not the actual 
physical production of sounds and words. 
Transfluency is one scholar’s extension of this idea of 
self-acceptance.217 Under the concept of transfluency, stuttering 
  
 212 See JEZER, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing how stuttering differs from other 
disabilities). But see Douglas C. Baynton, Bodies and Environments: The Cultural 
Construction of Disability, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 387, 388 (Peter David 
Blanck ed., 2000) (discussing society’s role in constructing even such an “obvious” 
disability as mobility impairment by providing the example of a person who cannot 
walk but who nonetheless can move about freely in a wheelchair to the extent that the 
“built environment” allows for wheelchair use, noting that “[a]n impairment-centered 
definition of disability [which the ADA is modeled on] selects walking as a major life 
activity and rolling on wheels as an inferior substitute necessitated by the inability to 
engage in a normal life activity”). Still, though, stuttering is different: a person who 
cannot walk is able to move about in a wheelchair, but a person who stutters can speak 
intelligibly without any device or aid. 
 213 JEZER, supra note 7, at 13 (discussing the importance of time and listener 
reactions to stuttering). 
 214 Stuttering Info, Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L STUTTERING ASS’N, 
http://www.nsastutter.org/stutteringInformation/FAQ.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
 215 See Yeoman, supra note 21, at 43 (describing the philosophy of the 
National Stuttering Project, the forerunner to the National Stuttering Association). 
 216 Stuttering Info, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 214. 
 217 Cristóbal Loriente, The Demedicalization of Stuttering: Towards a Notion 
of Transfluency, 3 J. STUTTERING, ADVOC. & RES. 131, 139 (2009). 
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is viewed as a “distinctive feature or a manifestation of human 
diversity, but never as a pathological symptom.”218 Transfluency 
considers stuttering a “manifestation of diversity in speech 
pattern, as being black, homosexual and left-handed are 
expressions of diversity in race, sexual orientation and 
hemispheric dominance.”219 According to transfluency, 
stuttering is a “dramatically different speech pattern,” but it is 
“as human—or as natural—as the fluent one.”220 The conception 
is partially based upon the view that interruptions in 
stutterers’ speech are not the cause of the problem; rather, the 
problem is the social stigma that often accompanies those 
interruptions.221 People who stutter are often banished to the 
“closet,”222 the result of being faced with stereotypes and cruelty 
from society—manifested in “disapproving gestures, looks, 
mockery”—that results in “a personal identity associated with 
pain and suffering.”223 Transfluency dignifies people who stutter, 
calling them out of the closet to express themselves and live 
freely.224 Therefore, transfluency theory holds that stuttered 
speech is not worse than fluent speech; it is just different. Under 
this conception, discrimination protection through the ADAAA 
  
 218 Id. at 131. Perhaps, though, such a characterization can more broadly be 
applied to the concept of disability, blurring this note’s line of disability and identity. 
See Baynton, supra note 212, at 387 (stating that “activists in the disability rights 
movement and scholars in the new disability studies increasingly argue that . . . the 
concept of disability is fraught with ambiguity and based on highly variable cultural 
rules and values concerning the body, personal competence, social interaction, 
individual responsibility, dependence and independence”). 
 219 Loriente, supra note 217, at 131. Employment discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation is not banned under a federal statute. See Matthew Barker, Note, 
Employment Law⎯Antidiscrimination⎯Heading Toward Federal Protection for Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 111, 129 (2009) (noting 
that “Congress has made repeated unsuccessful attempts to pass the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act,” a bill that would proscribe employment discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation). But, numerous states and municipalities have taken this 
action, including both New York State and New York City. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 296 (McKinney 2010); N.Y.C. CODE § 8-107 (2011). A state or municipality could 
include stuttering discrimination protections in its antidiscrimination statutes before 
this is done on the federal level in order to judge on a smaller scale whether such a 
change is effective and meaningful. 
 220 Loriente, supra note 217, at 131. 
 221 Id. at 137. 
 222 Loriente uses this term: he argues that “medicalization” of stuttering “conveys 
a lonely and marginalized way of living (symbolized by the metaphor of the closet).” Id. at 
136. Loriente explains, “The way of life of those living in the closet is directed by lies, 
secrecy, and silence.” Id. at 137 n.6. While closet certainly conjures connections with sexual 
orientation, the concept is not out of place in the context of stuttering. Thus, this note will 
use closet when appropriate, while acknowledging that the term may not bring with it the 
exact same meaning that it has in the context of sexual orientation. 
 223 Id. at 137. 
 224 Id. at 140. 
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makes less sense because stuttering no longer exists as a 
disability; it is rather an element of an individual’s identity. 
Another scholar proposes a legal theory that is relevant 
in continuing the analysis of stuttering as an identity trait.225 
Described as covering, “a subtler form of discrimination has 
risen,” where discrimination does not aim at groups as a whole 
but rather at the subset of the group that refuses to assimilate 
(i.e., cover).226 Kenji Yoshino identifies a judicial bias towards 
covering that he views as dangerous because of its perpetuation 
of inequality, “what reassures one group of its superiority to 
another.”227 Groups that society requests to cover are asked “to 
be small in the world,” to accept inequality and a “second-class 
citizenship.”228 According to Yoshino, everybody covers, there is 
no mainstream, and “[i]t is not normal to be completely 
  
 225 Kenji Yoshino, The Pressure to Cover, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 15, 2006. 
 226 Id. Through the lens of sexual orientation, Yoshino describes conversion 
and passing as concepts that precede covering. Conversion refers to “attempts to 
convert homosexuals into heterosexuals.” KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN 
ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 32 (2006). Passing describes gay individuals living in 
the closet. Id. at 69. Covering, then, refers to muting one’s identity on the axis of 
appearance, affiliation, activism, and association in order to gain mainstream 
acceptance. Id. at 79-80 (referring to gays “acting straight” as an example of covering). 
While this is not equivalent to stuttering, it is possible to analogize. Conversion would 
refer to the still-widespread attempts to speak fluently through speech therapy. 
Passing, therefore, would describe the attempts to hide oneself as a stutterer⎯using 
tricks to try not to stutter, the most extreme form of which is to become covert. See 
supra Part I. And, covering, then, would refer to the way people who are open about 
their stuttering still try not to stutter in certain situations where they believe it is less 
acceptable, or how they continue to downplay the large role that stuttering plays in 
their lives. Covering would also refer to the people who stutter so frequently that they 
try not to talk: people know they stutter, but they try to be more “normal” by speaking 
less. Interestingly, stuttering (as a condition in society) seems to be simultaneously 
going through each of these three phases. 
 227 Yoshino, supra note 225. Theoretically, the accommodation model of 
disability-discrimination law should protect disabled individuals from needing to cover. 
YOSHINO, supra note 226, at 173. But courts have limited this accommodation 
principle, instead continuing to prefer assimilation. Id. at 174-76. Interestingly, 
Yoshino explains that courts have done this by interpreting the definition of disability 
strictly, which the ADAAA is designed to change. Id. at 175. 
 228 Yoshino, supra note 225. Yoshino provides some examples of disabled 
individuals covering—a visually impaired person who dresses well, does not use a cane, 
and memorizes what she must read aloud, as well as people with mobility impairments 
who “use able-bodied people as ‘fronts’” to travel with. YOSHINO, supra note 226, at 172. 
Remember, though, that individuals with sight and motion impairments would have 
difficulty covering because their impairment would tend to be obvious. This is not the 
case for many stutterers, who can choose to not speak or be covert. Stuttering, then, 
remains more in the passing phase, which is why explicitly enshrining stuttering 
antidiscrimination provisions in a statute would likely help stutterers leave their 
closets. See infra Part V.B. And note again how stuttering is different from other 
disabilities, as it is easier to pass as a nonstutterer than to pass as lacking many other 
physical impairments. 
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normal.”229 Yoshino believes that the “free[dom] to develop our 
human capacities without the impediment of witless 
conformity . . . extends beyond traditional civil rights groups.”230 
While stutterers do not constitute a traditional civil rights 
group, Yoshino believes that this freedom of individual 
personhood should extend beyond the traditional groups to 
confront coerced conformity everywhere, blurring the view of 
what it means to be normal and in the mainstream.231 
B. Coverage for Stuttering in the Civil Rights Act 
The alternative view of stuttering would lead to coverage 
of stuttering discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. This statute prohibits employers’ discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.232 These 
categories are all traits or aspects of personhood with which 
people identify but have historically been imputed with 
inferiority by society. The statute would need to be amended to 
cover stuttering: this would not work under the existing 
framework.233 While a statute cannot directly change a person’s 
outlook, explicit coverage of stuttering in Title VII would not 
only affect the actions of employers, but it may also empower 
people who stutter to discover more of their true potential.234 
There are several advantages to covering stuttering 
under the Civil Rights Act rather than under the ADA. Were 
stuttering included in this category, the processes under the 
ADAAA would be dispensed with (i.e., whether stuttering is 
substantially limiting, whether a stutterer was regarded as 
having an impairment, and whether a stutterer is qualified for 
the job). This recognition would eliminate the catch-22 problem 
  
 229 Yoshino, supra note 225.  
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 42 § U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 233 Alternatively, an entirely new statute could be created, like the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, which was enacted for age discrimination. The goal 
is not Title VII coverage precisely, but rather a statutory scheme where stuttering need 
not undergo the preliminary determination of whether it is substantially limiting for it 
to be covered (as it does in the disability context). 
 234 See Yeoman, supra note 21, at 47 (describing one stutterer’s outlook that 
stutterers need to hear other people stutter so that they can have role models). An 
organization called Our Time Theatre Company strives to give young people who 
stutter a safe space to express themselves and pursue their artistic abilities. Taro 
Alexander, Our Time Provides Kids Their Time, 1 J. STUTTERING, ADVOC. & RES. 33, 
33-34 (2006) (describing how “an environment of unconditional acceptance 
transforms . . . fear and shame into confidence and self-esteem”). At Our Time, 
stuttering on stage during live shows is allowed and encouraged. Id. at 35. 
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of ADAAA enforcement. Plaintiffs would not need to worry that 
they would be considered substantially limited in speaking and 
thus not qualified235 for the job. Conversely, they would not need 
to be concerned that their qualifications would prevent them 
from being considered substantially limited. By changing the 
way stuttering discrimination is conceived, employees would be 
able to stutter as much or as little as they needed to—or 
wanted to—fully aware that they are protected against 
discrimination. And, furthermore, covering all stutterers would 
solve the problem of taking into consideration stutterers who 
are more affected by the emotional aspect of stuttering than 
the physical aspect. In this way, the enforcement of 
nondiscrimination in the workplace would be more easily 
accomplished for employees who stutter.236 
Another reason why the identity model of stuttering 
antidiscrimination enforcement would be positive is that it 
would encourage stutterers to come out of their closets.237 
Congress’s automatic recognition of stuttering in a statute as a 
trait protected against discrimination would more easily allow 
for people who stutter to choose not to hide their speech. To the 
extent that society wants to encourage openness, the personhood 
model would likely go far in encouraging (and perhaps 
accomplishing) it. In fact, research indicates that stutterers face 
problems in the workplace not only because of discrimination 
from supervisors, but also because of their own attitudes about 
their stuttering.238 One study indicates that some stutterers did 
not choose the career they wanted because of stuttering and 
avoided jobs that required use of the telephone or making oral 
presentations.239 Another study shows that 50 percent of 
stutterers looked for jobs requiring little speaking and 21 
percent have declined a new job or promotion because of fears 
associated with stuttering.240 Some people who stutter feel 
trapped in an unwanted job because of their stuttering.241 This 
  
 235 Qualified in this context means that an employer could not say that a job 
requirement of excellent oral communication skills requires nonstuttered speech. To be 
qualified, the stutterer would, of course, still need to otherwise satisfy that 
requirement and meet all other job requirements. 
 236 The relative complexity of the ADAAA model that this note proposes would 
be disposed of. See supra Part IV. 
 237 See supra note 222. 
 238 Klein & Hood, supra note 41, at 256. 
 239 Id. at 257 (citing R. Hayhow et al., Stammering and Therapy Views of 
People Who Stammer, 27 J. FLUENCY DISORDERS 1 (2002)). 
 240 Id. at 266. 
 241 Id. at 267. 
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indicates the extent to which stutterers limit themselves in 
regards to their own employment opportunities. The changing of 
attitudes like these will ultimately be necessary in order for 
stutterers to reach their full employment capabilities.  
There are also drawbacks to this identity model of 
stuttering. Because stuttering is a variable trait, the ADAAA 
may work better; under the substantially limits conception, 
courts would understandably find people who stutter severely 
to be disabled, and people who stutter mildly not to be 
disabled.242 This personhood theory would be overinclusive in 
that it would cover stutterers who stutter rarely and at the 
same time are not emotionally affected by stuttering.243 Also, 
perhaps some stutterers have such severe impediments or  
conditions that they are not realistically employable; 
companies may have business reasons not to hire a severe 
stutterer. Under the ADAAA, such an individual would not be 
covered because he or she would not be qualified for the job. 
Under Title VII, coverage would depend upon the way the 
statutory amendment is laid out;244 it’s more likely here, though, 
than under the ADAAA, that this person would be covered, as 
the identity theory rests on a modicum of acceptance of 
stuttering in the society at large that is probably not yet 
present in the culture. But Title VII does not cover 
everything.245 Accordingly, a public-safety exception for 
stuttering may be advisable; stutterers may be ill-suited for 
certain jobs that depend upon rate of speed in talking (e.g., air-
traffic controller).246 Furthermore, under Title VII, stutterers 
  
 242 This individualized inquiry would make sense if the level of severity took 
into account both the physical and emotional aspects of stuttering. But if courts only 
looked at frequency of stutters, rather than at how much stuttering affects a person 
holistically, employees would too frequently be mischaracterized. See supra Part I. 
 243 Some kind of medical diagnosis of stuttering would probably be a wise 
requirement here, so that individuals who do not stutter do not take advantage of this 
new statutory provision. 
 244 The McDonnell-Douglas test would still apply. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 37-42. 
 245 Title VII permits classifications on the basis of “religion, sex, or national 
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide 
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.” RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 129 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006)). This provision, known as the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ), does not include race. Id. The BFOQ, though, has been 
interpreted very narrowly. Id. at 129, 143. 
 246 And, if the statute were written in a less progressive way, there could be 
other exceptions besides a safety exception. For example, perhaps employers of 
broadcasters would still be able to discriminate, if the public would not accept the 
transfluency notion of people stuttering across the airwaves. For an example of 
stuttering being accepted on the stage, see supra note 234. 
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would likely not be entitled to reasonable accommodation.247 
While this makes sense in the context of the personhood 
model,248 it would be impractical for a stutterer for whom an 
accommodation would be very helpful. This lack of entitlement 
to accommodation is a significant drawback because it is likely 
that most stutterers would not suddenly come to believe in 
acceptance and transfluency. In other words, many stutterers 
at this point in time would likely want access to 
accommodations because they will not be comfortable with 
their stuttering. 
Ultimately, while the identity model would be the more 
effective way to counter discrimination, the disability model is 
the more practical method of dealing with this problem at this 
point in time. Stuttering discrimination conceived as a 
disability can be covered under the existing ADA, while 
protection against stuttering discrimination as an identity 
characteristic would require Congressional action.249 
CONCLUSION 
Employment discrimination on the basis of stuttering is 
an important issue to examine because it is widespread and 
limiting for stutterers, and because there should be legal 
protection for people who stutter. Coverage for stuttering should 
include both the physical and emotional aspects of the condition. 
One way for stuttering to be covered is as a disability under the 
ADA. The recent amendments to the ADA increase the 
likelihood that it would be covered. Another way for stuttering to 
be covered is as an identity characteristic under the Civil Rights 
Act. Both methods of coverage are compelling. While the Civil 
  
 247 This assumes that a Title VII amendment for stuttering would track race 
discrimination, as there is no right to accommodation in that area. There is, though, a 
certain accommodation right in Title VII regarding religious discrimination, so it’s 
possible that a Title VII amendment for stuttering could include such an 
accommodation. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 146-47. 
 248 No accommodation would be necessary if stuttered speech were just as 
valid as nonstuttered speech—there would be nothing for which to accommodate. 
 249 Is there a third way to conceive of stuttering? Ruth Colker describes the 
term “hybrid” as “people who lie between bipolar legal categories⎯bisexuals, 
transsexuals, multiracials, and the somewhat disabled.” RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: 
BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW xi (1996). 
Regarding disability, she reports that the phrase “temporarily able-bodied” has been 
used to describe the “transient nature of . . . disability status.” Id. at xiii. While Colker 
focuses on categories like body size, perhaps this can describe stuttering. Id. at 165. 
The variable nature of stuttering can cause it to greatly affect a person’s life at times, 
yet not be any issue at other times. Sometimes this shift can occur over a period of 
months or years, and other times it can occur within hours or minutes. 
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Rights Act would provide broader protection, stuttering will 
more realistically be covered under the amended ADA because it 
does not require any further congressional action. In whichever 
way, discrimination based on stuttering should be proscribed so 
that people who stutter can more easily enjoy the full measure of 
their civil rights. 
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